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I. The Farmers' Plight 
A. Overview 
The farm credit crisis, the inability of significant 
number of farmers to obtain credit to remain in business 
has been brewing for four years. Since 1981, farm assets 
have declined from $952 billion to $920 billion while debt 
has risen from $179 billion to $200 billion. During the 
same time net farm income dropped from $30.9 billion to 
$16.1 billion in 1983. Net farm income has improved since 
while total debt has stabilized. However, assets have 
depreciated substantially in the last year and probably 
will continue to decline. This decline has prompted banks 
to draw the line, and farmers are being forced out in 
larger than normal numbers. 
B. Current Situation 
The current crisis situation for farmers has two 
components (a) a long term income problem and (b) a short 
term operating credit problem. Many farmers are unlikely 
to get operating credit to plant their crops this spring. 
The immediacy of this problem has prompted grave 
Congressional and Public concern. Numerous bills have 
been introduced which seek to alleviate this problem. How 
many farmers won't get credit is difficult to estimate. 
Estimates run from 3 to 15 percent. My guess is that the 
final number will be closer to the bottom number, even if 
Congress does nothing. 
The short term credit problem is really an extension of a 
long term credit problem, which is caused by the factors 
mentioned in the overview. Thus, a short term credit 
bailout will not solve the problem. Consequently, 
Congress will have to deal with the credit crunch again. 
Which farmers are in serious financial trouble and who are 
they? In seeking to answer this question, it is important 
to keep in mind that hard data is limited. Fortunately, 
USDA has just recently completed a study which enhances 
our understanding. 
Before discussing this study, the variability in the 
financial picture of farms needs to be stressed. Similar 
farmers can be in dissimilar situations: one in good 
shape, one on the verge of bankruptcy. However, in 
general, it is thought that the larger the farmer, the 
greater the amount of nonfarm income, the greater the 
efficiency, the lower the debt load, and the earlier the 
debt was acquired, the lower the debt stress. 
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Having stated the above, crucial indicators of stress are 
cash flow and debt/asset ratio. The latter indicates the 
potential borrowing ability of the farmer: the higher 
debt/asset, the smaller the potential collateral. Cash 
flow measures the amount of cash available to the farming 
operation. It can be figured many ways but one common 
definition is: gross farm income - operating expenses + 
off-farm income - interest payments - debt repayment -
family living expenses. If this is less than zero, then 
the farmer must either cut his living standard, borrow 
more money, or not pay principal and /or interest. 
Assuming the farm family will consume only at the poverty 
level, USDA estimated that 294,800 farms in 1983 had a 
negative cash flow (13.4% of all farms). These farmers 
have debt/asset ratios over 40% and gross farm sales under 
$100,000 or debt/asset ratios over 70% and gross farm 
sales between $100,000 and $250,000. 
Seventy thousand of the farms with negative cash flow (3% 
of all farms) were estimated to be technically insolvent 
(debt/asset ratios over 100%). These farmers probably are 
not farming today. 
Farms with negative cash flow had 26.6% of the farm debt 
whereas 11% of the farm debt was owed by farms which USDA 
considered to be technically insolvent. 
There is one other element that needs to be kept in mind: 
USDA data shows that farmers who had little or no off-farm 
income and less than $100,000 in farm sales and farmers 
with cash sales over $100,000 and a debt/asset ratio over 
40% and little to no nonfarm income were probably 
experiencing stress. Thus, part of the problem is lack 
of nonfarm income. How many additional farmers does this 
observation add to the financially stressed. This cannot 
be estimated accurately. 
There is a myth that declining asset values endangers the 
survivability of a farm. It does endanger the 
survivability to the extent that a farmer can't borrow 
additional funds, but with stagnate income borrowing 
additional money probably only prolongs the agony. What 
really determines the survivability is if cash flow can 
cover debt and interest payments. This number is not 
affected by asset value. You do have a loss of wealth 
however when asset values decline. 
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C. Ohio Situation 
Many Ohio farmers are experiencing the same stress as 
farmers in other areas of the u.s. However, the situation 
is not quite as bad as in the central states. According 
to USDA, Ohio farm operators had a debt/aset ratio of 18 
percent while u.s. farmers and Iowa farmers had a 
debt/asset ratio of 21 and 26 percent respectively. 
In March 1984, 13% of Ohio farm operators had debt/aset 
ratios greater than 50%. USDA data suggests the national 
number is 14%. 
Generally, Ohio farmers in financial problem have, 
unfortunately, experienced 3 or 4 weather reduced crops in 
the last 5 years. Thus, Mother Nature has caused some of 
the debt stressed. 
D. Conclusion 
o Even if Congress approves a short term credit plan some 
farms will not get credit. Maybe as many as 3%. These 
will be mostly small and middle size farmers so impact on 
total production will be minimal. 
o Five percent of u.s. farmers are probably lost even if 
Congress acts with a substantive bail out and no reduction 
in current price supports. 
o A bail out plan would mostly help medium and small 
producers 
o Situation is apparently showing signs of stabilizing, but 
stabilizing at a bad level. Specifically, debt has been 
stable over the last few years. 
o Any decrease in prices for crop and livestock, assuming 
production costs don't decline as much, will further 
curtail cash flow. The result will be more bankrupt and 
financially stressed farmers.. Thus, the best intermediate 
credit public policy for agriculture is to maintain 
existing price support levels. 
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II. THE BANKER'S FRIGHT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Farm lenders are in trouble and they are scared. They see 
farmers in trouble and the agribusinesses that supply 
them. Farmers Home and Farm Credit system seem to be in 
particularly bad shape. Bankers are especially alarmed at 
the recent rapid de preciation in land values, which means 
that they cannot recoup the original value of the loan if 
the farmer goes under. That, in turn, erodes their 
capital base, which puts them in trouble. 
B. OVERVIEW 
Farmers had $213 billion in debt at the end of 1984. 
Sources of this credit and their relative share are: 
Individuals and others (23 percent), Farm Credit System 
(31 percent), banks (24 percent), life insurance companies 
(6 percent), Farmers Home Administration (12 percent), and 
Commodity Credit Corporation (4 percent) 
This brief will concentrate on Farmers Home, Farm Credit 
System, and private banks. Individuals and others are 
important sources of both real estate and non-real estate 
loans. The farm credit crisis has a direct impact on them 
since they generally don't have a capital reserve or 
insurance funds. However, this market is very difficult 
to describe. What data is available on life insurance 
companies indicate that they have experienced significant 
deterioration in their loan portfolios. For instance, as 
a percent of outstanding farm loans, delinquent loans 
stood at 10.4 percent on June 1984. This is a record high 
since the data series began in 1954. While life insurance 
companies have had a rough last two years and bad farm 
debts will hinder their recovery, it is important to note 
that farm mortgages total only 2.2 percent of total life 
insurance company assets and 9.2 percent of their mortgage 
assets. 
C. FARMERS HOME (FmHA) 
Farmers Home has traditionally had the role of lender of 
last resort for farmers who can't get operating or 
ownership loans elsewhere. They also provide loans for 
disasters, both natural and economic. 
Given the tough times in U.S. agriculture, Farmer Home's 
share of the farm loan market has grown from 7% in 1978 to 








banks are almost 30 percent of commercial 
banks). Sixty percent of agricultural banks 
Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, and 
During first eight months of 1984, agricultural banks 
represented 24 percent of total failed banks. In the last 
four months agricultural banks were 71% of failed banks. 
Banks have about $50 billion in agricultural loans. 
Problems with private ag~icultural loans are greatest in 
California and the Midwest. Because of the small percent 
of all loans which are agricultural loans, the California, 
however, banks are not in trouble. 
The deterioration in agricultural banks appears to have 
been in part a catching up with the ~est of the banking 
system. On average ,agricultural banks have capital to 
total asset ratios which average around 9%. Thus, most 
agricultural banks are in a strong position to absorb 
current foreseen losses. 
What sca~es private bankers is the rapid decline in land 
values and therefore the liquidation value of bad loans. 
The present is not the concern, the future is. 
F. OHIO SITUATION 
Ohio is much better off than the central states: this is 
not to imply that Ohio doesn't have any problems. 
There are ten national banks in Ohio which are on the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's problem list. 
Five are agricultural banks. Some state agricultural 
banks are on the state bank examiner's problem list, but a 
specific number could not be obtained. 
Ohio has not had a bank failu~e for the last 15-20 years. 
Reasons are strong state bank holding companies, an active 
merger market, and good state regulation. 
No foreclosures are seen this year. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
o FmHA has significant financial problems. Forty-seven 
percent of their agricultural loans a~e delinquent. 
Eventually, most of these loans ($11 billion) will have to 
be absorbed by the Gove~nment. 
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As of OctobeL 31, 1984, FmHA had $25.5 billion in 
outstanding farm loans: farm ownership - $6.8 billion; 
farm opeLating - $4.1 billion; disaster emergency - $10 
billion, and economic emergency - $4.3 billion. 
Delinquency rates as a percent of loans: farm ownership -
26%; farm opeLating - 32%, disaster emergency - 65%, 
economic emergency - 53%. 
Currently, FmHA's best guess is that it is holding 29,512 
acres off the market. They must eventually sell these to 
family farmers. Most of the acres are in the Southeast, 
where FmHA has upwards to a 50% share of market, and 
Midwest, where FmHA has only about a 10% market share. 
D. FARM CREDIT SYSTEM (FCS) 
FCS is composed of the Production Credit Associations, 
which make opeLating loans, Federal Land Banks, which make 
ownership loans, and Bank for Cooperatives which lends to 
Cooperatives. 
FCS is regulated by the Farm Credit Administration, which 
is an independent agency that has repaid its original 
capital to the Federal Government. FCS's sole purpose is 
to make loans to farmers and farmer cooperatives. 
FCS has a current loan portfolio of $80 billion with $50 
billion in the Land Banks. 
FCS recently had to infuse its Spokane district with $300 
million to keep it afloat. Problem stems from 
agricultural loans but also loans to fishing boat owners 
in the Northwest. FCA also expects that it may have to 
bail out its Omaha and Wichita districts. 
Farm Credit System currently 
in nonearning assets. It is 
of property off the market. 
States. 
has $2 - 2.5 billion dollars 
holding $500 million dollars 
Most is in the Central 
Although FCS earned $440 million (estimate) in 1984, it 
charged off $368 million (estimate), the largest ever. It 
believes the Production Credit Association have bottomed 
but the problems are just starting at the Land Banks. 
E. PRIVATE BANKS 
Banks which have agricultural loans that comprise 25 




o Farm Credit System has significant financial problems, 
especially in Spokane, Omaha, and Wichita. The problem is 
that, in using the system to bail out the weak brothers, 
the system itself is weakened. Substantial problems are 
developing at the Land Banks. 
o Agricultural loans at private banks have deteriorated in 
general over the last 12 months. However, only those 
private banks which have a heavy portfolio of agricultural 
loans (over 50%) are probably in immediate danger. In a 
16 state midwestern/high plain area, over one-fourth of 
2,935 agricultural banks had a ratio at least this high. 
o Private agricultural banks do not see a current operating 
funds problem. They will lend this money, but what they 
fear is the errosion in capital, i.e. land, values. If 
they have to foreclose, their assets have less value and 
consequently their capital base is eroded. When capital 
is only 9% of assets, it does not take many liquidations 
to wipe out a capital base. Thus, the fear of 
agricultural bankers of declining asset values, 
particularly those with heavy agricultural portfolios. 
The immediate future is their focal point. This future, 
with declining land values, makes banks reluctant to lend 
operating money. 
o Excluding Farmers Home, on January 1, 1985, Farmers had 
$168 billion in debt. The national banking system 
(insured commercial banks) has about $2.4 trillion in 
assets while the national securities market is $6.7 
trillion. 
o For comparison's sake, when Penn Square failed, it had 
$511 million in assets and when Continentia! Illinois was 
bailed out by the Federal Reserve Board, it had $41.8 
billion in assets. If 30 percent of non-FmHA farm debt 
has to be foreclosed, which is considered possible, you 
have bad debt of $50.4 billion. This number is comparable 
to Continental Illinois. So, there is a danger to the 
banking community, but I don't think it should be 
overemphasized at present. But, there is a clear threat 
to regional banking in central states (Iowa, Kansas, 
Nebraska, Missouri, Colorado, and South Dakota.) 
o In examining the Bankers' Fright, it is important to keep 
in mind the testimony of Charles Thacker, Associate 
Director, Division of Bank Supervision, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, before the Senate's Committee on 
Small Business: 
"Insofar as agricultural banks are concerned, we have 
yet to see an agricultural bank fail solely because of 
the condition of the agricultural ecomomy." 
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o Thus, the farm crisis is not likely to send shock waves 
through the banking community by itself. But this is the 
third shock to the banking system -- foreign debt and 
energy loans were the first two. How much more can the 
banking system take, especially if a fourth shock hits or 
the foreign debt shock occurs again before the 
agricultural banking crisis passes? 
o A short term credit bailout of farmers does little to help 
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2/12/85. 
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